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ABSTRACT 
In June 2018, the German Constitutional Court decided on the search of a law firm and 
the securing of documents and data in the firm’s premises by the Public Prosecutors’ Office. 
The Court rejected the respective constitutional complaints and regarded the prosecutions’ 
measures as lawful. The Court’s orders received immense public attention as the constitu-
tional complaints were filed by Volkswagen AG, Jones Day, and the firm’s lawyer in con-
nection with the “diesel emissions scandal”. Besides, the orders were discussed intensely 
among legal experts, as the Court severely limited legal privilege in Germany. This article 
examines the Court’s orders and its consequences, in particular with regard to internal 
investigations. In addition, the authors draw a comparison with legal privilege under U.S. 
law and discuss possible options to avoid extensive disclosure of documents and data. Finally, 
they demand legislative action and request the legislator to provide adequate safeguards for 
internal investigations. 
			
1  This article was first published in German in September 2018: Markus S. Rieder and Jonas Menne, Internal 
Investigations – Rechtslage, Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten und rechtspolitischer Handlungsbedarf, CORPORATE 
COMPLIANCE ZEITSCHRIFT 203 (2018). The authors would like to thank Christoph Saake for his active 
support in the legal research for the article as well as Brendan Magee and Johanna Bauer for their support with 
the translation. The article reflects the personal views of the authors. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht – 
BVerfG) on the constitutional complaints of Volkswagen2, Jones Day3 and three of the 
firm’s lawyers4 received positive feedback in parts of the press: The investigating Public 
Prosecutor's Offices can continue to evaluate the “seized” and “explosive” internal VW 
documents that were found during the search of the firm’s Munich office in March 2017 
with highest judicial blessing.5 Apart from the fact that, according to the decisions of the 
Court, documents were not seized but secured in the course of the search, the perspective 
of the Court on the Jones Day case seems to have been a comparable one: With the simple 
reference to the necessary “effectiveness of criminal prosecution”6, the Court not only 
declared the search of a law firm to be legitimate, but at the same time also justified con-
siderable restrictions on the legal privilege. In the context of internal investigations, pro-
hibitions of seizure and further restrictions on the collection of evidence are to apply only 
to a very limited extent. The Court also questions if such mandates are genuinely tradi-
tional lawyers’ activities.7 And to show even more disdain for the lawyers’ profession, the 
Court also stated that Jones Day, as an “internationally active law firm”8, was not a holder 
of fundamental rights due to its lack of an organizationally independent position and its 
lack of a domestic center of activity.9 The firms' lawyers were also denied the right to rely 
on a violation of their own fundamental rights, since according to the Court the search 
warrant only affected the firm and not the individual lawyers.10 
 
Hard cases make bad law. This article examines the consequences of the Court’s decisions 
and the consequential restrictions on search and seizure bans with regard to lawyers’ 
premises, in particular in the context of internal investigations (II.B.). The legal situation 			
2  BVerfG, Orders of June 27, 2018 – 2 BvR 1405/17, 2 BvR 1780/17 = BeckRS 2018, 14189. 
3  BVerfG, Orders of June 27, 2018 – 2 BvR 1287/17, 2 BvR 1583/17 = BeckRS 2018, 14188. 
4  BVerfG, Order of June 27, 2018 – 2 BvR 1562/17 = BeckRS 2018, 14190. 
5  Cf. only reports by Spiegel Online, (Jul. 27, 2018), www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/vw-ermittler du-
erfen-beschlagnahmte-vw-unterlagen-auswerten-a-1216985.html; Welt, (Jul. 27, 2018), 
https://www.welt.de/print/die_welt/wirtschaft/article178943166/Ermittler-duerfen-VW-Akten-einse-
hen.html; Manager Magazin, (Jul. 27, 2018), www.manager-magazin.de/unternehmen/autoindustrie/volks-
wagen-verfassungsbeschwerde-abgeschmettert-a-1216984.html; and Handelsblatt, (Jul. 27, 2018), 
https://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/industrie/bundesverfassungsgericht-volkswagen-muss-bri-
sante-dokumente-im-dieselskandalherausgeben-/22774332.html?ticket=ST-2500188-
4trVmKCvFOR5jMBhzwA9-ap5. 
6  BVerfG, Orders of June 27, 2018 – 2 BvR 1405/17, 2 BvR 1780/17, marginal no. 78. 
7  BVerfG, Orders of June 27, 2018 – 2 BvR 1405/17, 2 BvR 1780/17, marginal no. 110. 
8  BVerfG, Orders of June 27, 2018 – 2 BvR 1287/17, 2 BvR 1583/17, marginal no. 1. 
9  BVerfG, Orders of June 27, 2018 – 2 BvR 1287/17, 2 BvR 1583/17, marginal no. 24 et seq. 
10  BVerfG, Order of June 27, 2018 – 2 BvR 1562/17, marginal no. 35 et seq. 	
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in Germany is compared with the US legal privilege (II.C.). This is followed by an analysis 
of the consequences for the responsibilities and duties of managing directors, when con-
ducting internal investigations and cooperating with German and foreign investigating 
authorities (III.) Finally, the resulting need for legislative action is pointed out (IV.). 
II. CURRENT LEGAL SITUATION IN GERMANY (ACCORDING TO THE CON-
STITUTIONAL COURT) 
 
A. Scope of Search and Seizure Prohibitions 
 
The Court’s decision has limited the scope of legal privilege under German law by severely 
narrowing the German Code of Criminal Prodecure’s restrictions regarding searches and 
seizures, but at least the decision largely clarified under which conditions investigating 
authorities are denied to access documents and data in a lawyer’s custody under the cur-
rent law.11 
 
To achieve this clarification, the Court had to decide on a dispute persisting since 2008, 
when § 160a StPO (Strafprozessordnung – German Code of Criminal Procedure) was im-
plemented. The dispute concerned the scope of application or rather the relationship of 
§ 160a and § 97 StPO.12 § 97 StPO stipulates that correspondence between an accused and 
his lawyer, notes concerning confidential information entrusted to a lawyer by an ac-
cused, and other objects which are covered by a lawyer’s right not to testify shall not be 
subject to seizure. According to § 160a (1) sentence 1 StPO, an investigation measure gen-
erally is inadmissible, when it is directed against a lawyer and it is expected to produce 
information in respect of which the lawyer would have the right to refuse to testify. How-
ever, § 160a (5) StPO regulates that § 97 StPO shall remain “unaffected”. This ambiguous 
wording was understood by some to mean that § 97 StPO should take precedence over 
§ 160a StPO and therefore limit the broad prohibition on the collection of privileged in-
formation stipulated by § 160a StPO in case of a seizure.13 In contrast, another interpreta-
tion concludes that the seizure of client documents within lawyers’ premises or within a 
law firm is inadmissible because § 160a StPO would expand the limited prohibitions in 
			
11  Differing: Carsten Momsen, Zur Zukunft strafrechtlicher Vertretung von Unternehmen in Deutschland, 
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 1362 (2018), who does not consider the decision a landmark due to the 
fact that the standard of review is limited to constitutional requirements. 
12  For an overview on the views represented in judicial literature, cf. Matthias Dann, Durchsuchung und Be-
schlagnahme in der Anwaltskanzlei, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 2609, 2913 (2015). 
13  Cf. LG Stuttgart, Order of March 26, 2018 – 6 Qs 1/18, marginal no. 40 et seq.; LG Bochum, Order of March 
16, 2016 – II-6 Qs 1/16, marginal no. 87 et seq. = NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR STRAFRECHT, 500, 501 et seq. (2016); 
LG Hamburg, Order of October 15, 2010 – 608 Qs 18/10, marginal no. 87; Bertram Schmitt, in: Straf-prozess-
ordnung, § 160a, marginal no. 17 (Lutz Meyer-Goßner & Bertram Schmitt, 2018); Jörn Hauschild, in: Mün-
chener Kommentar zur StPO, § 97, marginal no. 64 (Christoph Knauer et al eds., 2014). 	
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§ 97 StPO to further investigation measures including seizures. 14  The Constitutional 
Court did not agree with the latter and broader interpretation, and referenced the “con-
stitutionally required effectiveness of criminal prosecution”15 to establish § 97 StPO to be 
solely decisive for the measure of seizure.16 
 
In addition, the Court also excluded the broad protection of legal privilege resulting from 
§ 160a (1) sentence 1 StPO with regard to searches, since otherwise “the possibilities of ob-
taining evidence permitted under § 97 StPO [...] would be de facto impossible”.17 Unfor-
tunately, the Court ignored the fact that the wording of § 160a (1) sentence 1 in connection 
with § 160a (5) StPO clearly contradicts this due to a lack of reference to provisions cover-
ing searches. Moreover, since § 95 StPO provides an obligation to surrender seized objects, 
authorities would certainly have a different possibility to request objects even without 
searches.18 
 
Consequently, protection against search and seizure only exists if the following conditions 
are met cumulatively: Firstly, a special client-lawyer relationship is necessary, which re-
quires a relationship of an accused to his lawyer.19 Companies therefore have to be in a 
position similar to that of an accused due to an administrative offence or a revocation 
proceeding, and they must have mandated a lawyer or a law firm in connection with this 
proceeding. The prohibition of seizure in § 97 StPO only applies with regard to this rela-
tionship.20 
 
In the Jones Day case, the Constitutional Court (and previously the Munich I Regional 
Court (LG München I)) used the lack of such a relationship as main argument to deny 
the applicability of § 97 StPO. Although the complaining Volkswagen AG was involved 			
14  See, e.g., Margarete Gräfin v. Galen, LG Hamburg, 15. 10. 2010 – 608 Qs 18/10: Beschlagnahme von Interviewpro-
tokollen nach „Internal Investigations” – HSH Nordbank, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 942, 
945 (2011); Frank Peter Schuster, LG Hamburg, 15. 10. 2010 – 608 Qs 18/10: Beschlagnahme von Interviewproto-
kollen nach „Internal Investigations” – HSH Nordbank, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS-, STEUER- 
UND UNTERNEHMENSSTRAFRECHT, 26, 30 (2012). 
15  BVerfG, Orders of June 27, 2018 – 2 BvR 1405/17, 2 BvR 1780/17, marginal no. 78. 
16  BVerfG, Orders of June 27, 2018 – 2 BvR 1405/17, 2 BvR 1780/17, marginal no. 73 et seq. 
17  BVerfG, Orders of June 27, 2018 – 2 BvR 1405/17, 2 BvR 1780/17, marginal no. 76. 
18  However, the use of coercion against persons entitled to refuse to testify is inadmissible in this context, § 95 (2) 
sentence 2 StPO; cf. also Jörn Hauschild, in: Münchener Kommentar zur StPO, § 95, marginal no. 20 (Chris-
toph Knauer et al eds., 2014). 
19  BVerfG, Orders of June 27, 2018 – 2 BvR 1405/17, 2 BvR 1780/17, marginal no. 88. 
20  LG Bochum, Order of March 16, 2016 – II-6 Qs 1/16, marginal no. 68 = NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
STRAFRECHT, 500 (2016); LG Bonn, Order of June 21, 2012 –27 Qs 2/12, marginal no. 42 et seq. = NEUE ZEIT-
SCHRIFT FÜR KARTELLRECHT, 204, 204 et seq. (2013); LG Hamburg, Order of October 15, 2010 – 608 Qs 
18/10, marginal no. 70 = NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 942, 943 (2011); Bertram Schmitt, in Strafpro-
zessordnung, § 97, marginal no. 10 (Lutz Meyer-Goßner & Bertram Schmitt, 2018) with further references; 
Jörn Hauschild, in Münchener Kommentar zur StPO, § 97, marginal no. 8, 64 (Christoph Knauer et al eds., 
2014). 	
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in a preliminary investigation by the Braunschweig Public Prosecutor's Office and had 
also established a client relationship with Jones Day, the proceedings of the Munich Pub-
lic Prosecutor's Office conducting the search were directed against Audi, so that 
Volkswagen did not hold a position similar to that of an accused party in these proceed-
ings. Audi, on the other hand, had no mandate relationship with Jones Day, so that the 
prohibition of seizure constituted by § 97 StPO was not applicable with regard to this 
relationship either.21 
 
Secondly, the Constitutional Court specified the requirements for a legal entity to be con-
sidered in a position similar to an individual charged with a criminal offence (and there-
fore be protected from certain investigation measures). As a prerequisite, the entity has to 
be a possible subject to further investigations, according to objective criteria. This presup-
poses a “sufficient” (“hinreichend”) suspicion for a criminal offence or a breach of the 
duty of supervision committed by an individual person in management (§§ 30, 130 OWiG 
(Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz – German Act on Regulatory Offences)).22 According to the 
Court, legal privilege does not apply if a company is merely concerned about potential 
future investigations and therefore obtains legal advice or engages a law firm to conduct 
an internal investigation.23 
 
Thus the Court rejected the view expressed by, among others, the Bonn Regional Court 
(LG Bonn) in antitrust proceedings,24 according to which protection against seizure be-
gins with the initiation of formal proceedings. This would have enabled the investigating 
authorities to limit the application of the protections against seizure almost arbitrarily by 
delaying the official opening of criminal proceedings.25 At the same time, however, the 
requirements of the Constitutional Court also mean that searches and seizures are now 
clearly possible until sufficient, objective indications of a future involvement in a criminal 
case exist. 
 
With regard to the applicability of § 97 StPO, the Court clarified, that the seized docu-
ments would have been subject to prohibition and therefore inadmissible in the proceed-
ings against Volkswagen – even if only used to substantiate further suspicions –, pursuant 
to § 160a (1) sentence 2 StPO.26 However, the Public Prosecutor's Office in Braunschweig 
had already been conducting proceedings against Volkswagen since April 2016, so that 			
21  BVerfG, Orders of June 27, 2018 – 2 BvR 1405/17, 2 BvR 1780/17, marginal no. 96 et seq., 102 et seq. 
22  BVerfG, Orders of June 27, 2018 – 2 BvR 1405/17, 2 BvR 1780/17, marginal no. 93. 
23  BVerfG, Orders of June 27, 2018 – 2 BvR 1405/17, 2 BvR 1780/17, marginal no. 94. 
24  LG Bonn, Order of June 21, 2012 –27 Qs 2/12, marginal no. 42 et seq. = NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR KARTELL-
RECHT, 204, (2013). 
25  Cf. Ralf Eschelbach, in: Strafprozessordnung, § 97, marginal no. 11 (Helmut Satzger & Wilhelm Schluckebier 
& Gunter Widmaier, 3rd ed. 2018). 
26  BVerfG, Orders of June 27, 2018 – 2 BvR 1405/17, 2 BvR 1780/17, marginal no. 101. 	
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Volkswagen undoubtedly held a position similar to an individual charged with a crimi-
nal offence.27 
 
B. Cases of Authorized Searches and Seizures 
 
Since the prohibitions of searches and seizures at the lawyer's premises only apply when 
the client is in a position similar to that of a person charged with a criminal offense, doc-
uments drawn up in an internal investigation during the initial consultation or internal 
clarification of the facts may regularly be classified as seizable. The same applies to situa-
tions in which initially only the misconduct of individuals, especially below management 
level, is investigated. Even though a possible investigation against the company is already 
being considered and examined by external lawyers, the Constitutional Court does not 
regard this to be sufficient to cause protection against search and seizure. Hence, the 
Court does not follow regional courts’ decisions,28 which had granted such protection for 
earlier stages of internal investigations.29 
 
The Constitutional Court states that the search of law firms and the confiscation of client 
documents is always possible if the lawyer concerned had no client relationship with the 
respective defendant. As the decisions show, this occurs in particular with regard to 
group-wide matters, in which the mandate only relates to one of the group’s companies 
or a subsidiary. According to the Court, the protection against seizure provided by § 97 
StPO does not apply to other group companies or to the relationship between parent 
company and subsidiary within a group, if there is no explicit mandate from the respective 
group company or its subsidiaries.30 
 
The orders of the Constitutional Court give an advantage to investigating authorities, 
which can “adjust” the proceedings accordingly. Since the Public Prosecutor's Offices de-
cide on the connection and separation of proceedings at their duty-bound discretion,31 it 
would be possible to separate the preliminary proceedings against each of a group’s com-
panies involved and to conduct searches and seizures at the law firms of the respective 
other companies. The protection against searches and seizures stipulated in § 97 StPO 
would not apply, since it requires a position similar to that of a person charged with a 			
27  BVerfG, Orders of June 27, 2018 – 2 BvR 1405/17, 2 BvR 1780/17, marginal no. 6 et seq. 
28  These decisions, however, concern defense relationships in the meaning of § 148 StPO; cf. LG Braunschweig, 
Order of July 21, 2015 – 6 Qs 116/15, marginal no. 1 = NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS-, STEUER- UND 
UNTERNEHMENSSTRAFRECHT, 37 (2016); LG Gießen, Order of June 25, 2012 – 7 Qs 100/12, marginal no. 11 
= BeckRS 2012, 15498. 
29  BVerfG, Orders of June 27, 2018 – 2 BvR 1405/17, 2 BvR 1780/17, marginal no. 95. 
 
30  BVerfG, Orders of June 27, 2018 – 2 BvR 1405/17, 2 BvR 1780/17, marginal no. 104; differing view: LG Braun-
schweig, Order of July 21, 2015 – 6 Qs 116/15, marginal no. 12 et seq. = NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR STRAFRECHT, 
308, 309 (2016). 
31  BVerfG, Orders of June 27, 2018 – 2 BvR 1405/17, 2 BvR 1780/17, marginal no. 97. 	
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criminal offence – which would only exist for each company with regard to the investiga-
tion directed against itself. Although the Court points out that the procedural design may 
not circumvent the protection of § 97 (1) StPO, the recognition of such a constellation 
seems unlikely due to the discretion granted to the investigating authorities. 
 
With regard to internal investigations, it is repeatedly denied that conducting an investi-
gation qualifies as legal activity in a narrower sense at all.32 The Munich I Regional Court 
(LG München I) had similar doubts regarding the Volkswagen investigation conducted 
by Jones Day on whether the appointment of the law firm was at all to be qualified as a 
traditional lawyer's mandate – in particular because of the fact that Volkswagen was not 
allowed to influence the investigation in order to comply with the agreements with the 
Department of Justice.33 The Constitutional Court used this argument in the context of 
the principle of proportionality and stated that the client relationship was not character-
ized by a special relationship of trust, such as is usually inherent in a defense relationship 
or even the classic attorney-client relationship.34 The Court did not, however, go so far as 
to say, mandates from internal investigation generally do not require protection against 
searches and seizures. Nevertheless, the doubts about the classification as traditional legal 
activity seem very questionable, especially taking into account that internal investigations 
often aim to prepare the defense in preliminary proceedings. 
 
The fact that the documents and data in the Jones Day case could have been defense doc-
uments within the scope of § 148 StPO –with the consequence that they were also pro-
tected in the custody of the company - was not considered by the Constitutional Court at 
all.35 
 
C. Legal Comparison with the USA 
 
Contrary to its German equivalent, legal privilege under U.S. law offers extensive protec-
tion (even during internal investigations). It is essentially based on two legal institutions, 
the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine. 
 
The attorney-client privilege extensively protects the communication between a lawyer 
and his client. The confidentiality guaranteed by the attorney-client privilege is intended 			
32  Of this opinion, e.g., Renate Wimmer, in: Wirtschafts- und Steuerstrafrecht, § 152 StPO, marginal no. 17 (Wer-
ner Leitner & Henning Rosenau, 2017). 
33  BVerfG, Orders of June 27, 2018 – 2 BvR 1405/17, 2 BvR 1780/17, marginal no. 55. 
34  BVerfG, Orders of June 27, 2018 – 2 BvR 1405/17, 2 BvR 1780/17, marginal no. 110. 
35  Regarding the classification of the results of an internal investigation as defense documents cf. Jürgen D. Klen-
gel & Christoph Buchert, Zur Einstufung der Ergebnisse einer „Internal Investigation“ als Verteidigungsunter-
lagen im Sinne der §§ 97, 148 StPO, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR STRAFRECHT, 383 (2016); regarding the protec-
tion of defense documents in the custody of the company cf. LG Braunschweig, Order of July 21, 2015 – 6 Qs 
116/15, marginal no. 10; Sven Thomas/Simone Kämpfer, in Münchener Kommentar zur StPO, § 148, marginal 
no. 17, 19 (Christoph Knauer et al eds., 2014). 	
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to enable the client to obtain early and comprehensive legal assistance. He should be able 
to disclose all information relevant for legal assessment to his lawyer without having to 
fear that this communication is accessed by third parties.36 The attorney-client privilege 
requires an existing client relationship (or its initiation) as well as confidential communi-
cation between client and lawyer aimed at obtaining or providing legal assistance.37 
 
The attorney-client privilege applies to every lawyer admitted in the U.S. or abroad38 and 
does not distinguish – in contrast to German law – between external and in-house coun-
sel. Besides natural persons, the protection applies to legal entities as well. Since the U.S. 
Supreme Court's decision in “Upjohn Co. v. United States”, the communication of all em-
ployees of a legal entity, regardless of their position, can be protected by the attorney-client 
privilege.39 Interviews with employees conducted by external lawyers are therefore regu-
larly privileged.40 Communication with in-house counsel is only protected if the predom-
inant purpose of communication is legal advice.41 The scope of the attorney-client privi-
lege extends to both oral and written communication.42 
 
In addition to the protection of communication between lawyer and client, the work-
product doctrine protects the lawyer's work products from access by third parties, as long 
as they were created in preparation of a current or future legal dispute. This includes doc-
uments containing the facts of a case as well as legal assessments and analyses. Work prod-
ucts created within internal investigations may also be protected.43 			
36  SABRINA POTOČIĆ, KORRUPTION, AMERIKANISCHE BÖRSENAUFSICHT UND ERMITTLUNGEN DURCH 
PRIVATE IN DEUTSCHLAND, 270 (2016) with further references; regarding legal privilege cf. also Carsten Mo-
msen & Thomas Grützner, Gesetzliche Regelung unternehmensinterner Untersuchungen – Gewinn an Rechts-
staatlichkeit oder unnötige Komplikation?, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE ZEITSCHRIFT, 242, 248 et seq. (2017); 
Hendrik Schneider, Das Unternehmen in der Schildkröten-Formation – Der Schutzbereich des Anwaltsprivi-
legs im deutschen und US-Strafrecht, 9, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INTERNATIONALE STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK, 
626, 630 (2016). 
37  HANNO MERKT, SYNDIKUSANWALT UND DEUTSCHES ANWALTSPRIVILEG IM US-ZIVILPROZESS, 117 (2013); 
SABRINA POTOČIĆ, KORRUPTION, AMERIKANISCHE BÖRSENAUFSICHT UND ERMITTLUNGEN DURCH 
PRIVATE IN DEUTSCHLAND, 313 (2016). 
38  On the discussion to what extent foreign attorneys have the right to refuse to testify according to § 53 StPO, cf. 
Marcus Percic, in Münchener Kommentar zur StPO, § 53, marginal no. 2 (Christoph Knauer et al eds., 2014). 
39  Upjohn Co. v. U. S., 449 United States, 383 (389 et seq.); Jürgen Wessing, in Deutsch-Amerikanische Korrup-
tionsverfahren, § 6 marginal no. 103 et seq. (Jürgen Wessing & Matthias Dann, 2013); on the requirements in 
detail SABRINA POTOČIĆ, KORRUPTION, AMERIKANISCHE BÖRSENAUFSICHT UND ERMITTLUNGEN 
DURCH PRIVATE IN DEUTSCHLAND, 313 et seq. (2016). 
40  SABRINA POTOČIĆ, KORRUPTION, AMERIKANISCHE BÖRSENAUFSICHT UND ERMITTLUNGEN DURCH 
PRIVATE IN DEUTSCHLAND, 314 (2016). 
41  HANNO MERKT, SYNDIKUSANWALT UND DEUTSCHES ANWALTSPRIVILEG IM US-ZIVILPROZESS, 121 (2013) 
with further references. 
42  Cf. MARIUS MANN, ANWALTLICHE VERSCHWIEGENHEIT UND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 91 (2009). 
43  SABRINA POTOČIĆ, KORRUPTION, AMERIKANISCHE BÖRSENAUFSICHT UND ERMITTLUNGEN DURCH 
PRIVATE IN DEUTSCHLAND, 316 et seq. (2016) with further references; HANNO MERKT, SYNDIKUSANWALT 
UND DEUTSCHES ANWALTSPRIVILEG IM US-ZIVILPROZESS, 120 (2013) with further references. 	
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The legal privilege is accompanied by extensive obligations of disclosure in both civil and 
criminal proceedings. This is based on the fundamental principles of US procedural law, 
according to which the parties to the proceedings are obliged to engage in clarifying dis-
puted facts. A similar extent of disclosure does not exist under German law.44 
 
Furthermore, the protection of legal privilege no longer applies in case of a waiver. It is 
considered a waiver when protected communication or legal work products are disclosed 
to third parties. This has far-reaching consequences: Not only the specific piece of infor-
mation disclosed, but even all related documents and work products might no longer be 
considered privileged.45 
III. CONSEQUENCES FOR MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNAL 
INVESTIGATIONS 
 
A. Basics 
 
Generally speaking, companies are not obliged to file criminal charges because of internal 
incidents under corporate law.46 There is also no general obligation to cooperate with the 
Public Prosecutor's Office.47 However, this must be separated from the management’s 
obligations to conduct internal investigations if there are indications of irregularities in 
order to clarify the facts of the case. 
 
Although there is no general obligation to conduct internal investigations under German 
corporate law, which might result from the countless possible definitions and constella-
tions of internal investigations, an obligation to conduct an internal investigation may 
nevertheless arise from general managerial duties. 
 
For German Stock Corporations (Aktiengesellschaft – AG), such an obligation is being 
discussed for the management board and the supervisory board with reference to §§ 76 
			
44  HANNO MERKT, SYNDIKUSANWALT UND DEUTSCHES ANWALTSPRIVILEG IM US-ZIVILPROZESS, 114 et seq. 
(2013). 
45  SABRINA POTOČIĆ, KORRUPTION, AMERIKANISCHE BÖRSENAUFSICHT UND ERMITTLUNGEN DURCH 
PRIVATE IN DEUTSCHLAND, 319 (2016) with further references. 
46  A punishable obligation to report criminal offences exists only for the offences listed in § 138 StGB, which do 
not usually occur in a company; cf. also Jürgen Wessing, in Corporate Compliance, 1510 (Christoph Hauschka 
& Klaus Moosmayer & Thomas Lösler, 3rd ed. 2016). 
47  Jürgen Wessing, in Corporate Compliance, 1510 et seq. (Christoph Hauschka & Klaus Moosmayer & Thomas 
Lösler, 3rd ed. 2016). 	
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(1), 93 (1) sentence 1 AktG (Aktiengesetz – German Stock Corporation Act), stating a cor-
porate duty of care for managers.48 This includes the management board’s duty to ensure 
compliance with laws and internal company guidelines. If there are indications of viola-
tions, the management board must address those. Pursuant to § 93 (1) sentence 1 AktG, 
the management board has to exercise the diligence of a prudent and conscientious man-
ager in their conduct of business. Consequently, any indications of violations have to be 
followed by adequate investigations.49 
 
Even the Business Judgment Rule does not offer further discretion in this matter. § 93 (1) 
sentence 2 AktG requires the management board to act on the basis of “appropriate in-
formation”. Therefore, an entrepreneurial discretion exists solely on “how” to conduct 
an investigation, not on “whether” to perform it at all.50 In the ARAG/Garmenbeck de-
cision the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof – BGH) correspondingly 
stated, that while an investigation had to be performed, the extent and general execution 
remains at the discretion of the management board.51 Thus, the wide scope of action 
opened up by the Business Judgment Rule is only applicable with regard to the question 
of how and to what extent the investigation is conducted. The decisive factor then is 
whether the management board was entitled to assume to act on the basis of appropriate 
information in the best interest of the company.52 Whether a reaction is appropriate de-
pends on the circumstances of the individual case, in particular the significance of the pos-
sible violation and the expected effort of the investigation.53 
 
The supervisory board can also be obliged to conduct an internal investigations. Accord-
ing to § 111 (1) AktG, the supervisory board must monitor the actions of the management 
board. Again, the required measures vary depending on the individual case. According to 
the severity of the risk for the company, the supervisory board may either be limited to 
verifying that the management board has investigated the matter properly and responded 
appropriately to it, or may be obliged to conduct investigation measures on its own. Sim-
ilar to the management board’s duties, the discretion of the Business Judgment Rule does 
only apply to the operating criteria of an investigation.54 			
48  In addition, a link between the duty to investigate and the supervisory duty pursuant to § 130 OWiG, the duty 
to set up a monitoring system pursuant to § 91 (2) AktG or the general compliance responsibility of the man-
agement board are discussed; cf. Harald Potinecke & Florian Block, in Internal Investigations – Ermittlungen 
im Unternehmen, 25 et seq. (Thomas Knierim & Markus Rübenstahl & Michael Tsambikakis, 2nd ed. 2016). 
49  Harald Potinecke & Florian Block, in Internal Investigations – Ermittlungen im Unternehmen, 26 (Thomas 
Knierim & Markus Rübenstahl & Michael Tsambikakis, 2nd ed. 2016). 
50  Harald Potinecke & Florian Block, in Internal Investigations – Ermittlungen im Unternehmen, 27 (Thomas 
Knierim & Markus Rübenstahl & Michael Tsambikakis, 2nd ed. 2016). 
51  BGHZ 135, 244, 254 – ARAG/Garmenbeck = NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 1926, 1927 et seq. (1997). 
52  BGHZ 135, 244, 254 – ARAG/Garmenbeck = NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 1926, 1927 (1997). 
53  Cf. Heiner Hugger, Unternehmensinterne Untersuchungen – Erfahrungen und Standards der Praxis, ZEIT-
SCHRIFT FÜR DAS GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT, 214, 219 et seq. (2015). 
54  Harald Potinecke & Florian Block, in Internal Investigations – Ermittlungen im Unternehmen, 34 et seq. 
(Thomas Knierim & Markus Rübenstahl & Michael Tsambikakis, 2nd ed. 2016). 
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B. Internal Investigations Remain Admissible 
 
Internal investigations remain permissible and necessary – despite the fact that the orders 
of the Constitutional Court enable the confiscation of work products from the lawyer 
conducting the investigation. A reason for this is the aforementioned corresponding ob-
ligation under corporate law to clarify facts and carry out investigative measures due to 
certain events. Furthermore, the risk of seizure existed even before the decisions were 
made, due to the unclear legal situation. Now, based on the decisions of the Constitu-
tional Court, measures can be taken to minimize the risk of searches and seizures of a law-
yer’s premises. This can be achieved by taking a closer look at the discretion regarding the 
operating criteria of an internal investigation. 
 
In addition to the existing legal obligation, further good reasons for carrying out internal 
investigations exist: A comprehensive clarification of facts informs the company of all rel-
evant irregularities and thus enables the management to make informed decisions. Early 
clarification can also help to influence the interpretation of the facts – in public and me-
dial perception, and through cooperation with investigating authorities.55 
 
In cross-border cases, internal investigations are often without alternative anyway. In con-
trast to German law, U.S. authorities can force companies to fully investigate suspected 
criminal offences or have them investigated by external lawyers – as in the Volkswagen-
case. 
 
C. Possible Options 
 
1. Escape into a Voluntary Self-Disclosure? 
 
Since a report to the authorities could result in preliminary proceedings, the self-disclo-
sure of possible violations by a company could indicate a position similar to that of a per-
son charged with a criminal offence and thus justify the applicability of search and seizure 
prohibitions (II.A.). Companies therefore could increasingly consider the option of self-
disclosure, despite there being no legal obligation to do so (III.A.). 
 
This would, however, not only require the suspicion of a criminal offence committed 
within the company or by company employees, but also the acting person would have to 
be enumerated in § 30 OWiG, or a supervisory duty within the scope of § 130 OWiG 
would have to be breached. Furthermore, the resulting suspicion must be considered to 
be sufficient, measured by objective criteria, as stated in the Constitutional Court’s deci-
sion.56 
 			
55  Jürgen Wessing, in Corporate Compliance, 1512 et seq. (Christoph Hauschka & Klaus Moosmayer & Thomas 
Lösler, 3rd ed. 2016). 
56  BVerfG, Orders of June 27, 2018 – 2 BvR 1405/17, 2 BvR 1780/17, marginal no. 93. 
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Further reasons indicate that self-disclosure should be considered with caution and only 
after assessing each case thoroughly: 
 
Firstly, it remains possible that the Public Prosecutor’s Office does not assume sufficient 
suspicion on the basis of the report. A discretion is granted to authorities in proceedings 
against companies, due to the opportunity principle (§ 47 OWiG), while in proceedings 
against individual persons there is no discretion, based on the applicable principle of legal-
ity. And since the investigation against a company is at the prosecutions’ duty-bound dis-
cretion, there are numerous options for them besides initiating preliminary proceedings 
against the company. Alternatively, the Public Prosecutor's Office could choose initiating 
proceedings against individual defendants. This approach is demonstrated by the Consti-
tutional Court’s decision: Audi had also filed a criminal complaint with the Munich Pub-
lic Prosecutor's Office. The Prosecutor's Office then conducted preliminary investiga-
tions and – after being briefed by lawyers from Jones Day on the progress of the internal 
investigations – initially directed its investigation against parties unknown. Only after the 
search of the offices had taken place – a few days after the initiation of the preliminary 
proceedings the investigations against identified individuals and against the company be-
gan.57 The Public Prosecutor’s Office argued that the suspicion against the company had 
previously been insufficient to consider Audi to be in a position similar to that of a person 
charged with a criminal offence because the decision-making structures at Audi were un-
known.58 
 
Secondly, even the initiation of preliminary proceedings or the acceptance of sufficient 
suspicion offers only limited protection against searches and seizures: The respective pro-
hibitions only apply after all requirements of § 97 StPO are met. All documents created 
earlier are usually not considered privileged:59 Documents originating from before may 
only be protected, if they are considered documents of the defense pursuant to § 148 
StPO. In case of a defense counsel-client relationship, comprehensive protection is 
granted as soon as the mandate is initiated.60 However, this kind of relationship can be 
difficult to establish. Not every legal activity in an internal investigation qualifies as a tra-
ditional activity for the criminal defense (or its preparation). The defense counsel-client 
relationship is further limited by criminal law and professional law regulations (III.C.2.). 
Not least, extensive company-related cases regularly require internal investigations before 
a criminal charge can be filed. 			
57  BVerfG, Orders of June 27, 2018 – 2 BvR 1405/17, 2 BvR 1780/17, marginal no. 8 et seq., 28. 
58  BVerfG, Orders of June 27, 2018 – 2 BvR 1405/17, 2 BvR 1780/17, marginal no. 11. 
59  Renate Wimmer, in Wirtschafts- und Steuerstrafrecht, § 152 StPO, marginal no. 15 (Werner Leitner & Henning 
Rosenau, 2017). 
60  Cf. OLG München, Order of November 30, 2004 – 3 Ws 720-722/04 = NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR STRAF-
RECHT, 300, 301 (2006); Jörn Hauschild, in Münchener Kommentar zur StPO, § 97, marginal no. 29 (Chris-
toph Knauer et al eds., 2014); Matthias Jahn & Stefan Kirsch, Anmerkung zu einem Beschluss des LG Bonn v. 
21.06.2012 (27 Qs 2/12; NZWiSt 2013, 21) - Zum kartellrechtlichen Ermittlungsverfahren, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT 
FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS-, STEUER- UND UNTERNEHMENSSTRAFRECHT, 21, 30 (2013). 	
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Thirdly, a criminal charge may oppose the company’s interests. If sensitive information is 
involved, a premature disclosure to the investigating authorities could increase the danger 
that information could be leaked to the public. A premature involvement may also be 
counterproductive if the severity of the alleged of misconduct cannot be assessed yet. Even 
if cooperation with the authorities is sought, it is often advisable to first establish informal 
contact, ideally avoiding formal investigation proceedings.61 However, according to the 
orders of the Constitutional Court, an informal contact to the authorities does generally 
not raise sufficient suspicion for the application of the prohibitions of searches and sei-
zures. 
 
2. Group-Wide Mandating? 
 
The Constitutional Court has decided that even if all requirements of § 97 StPO are met, 
the protection granted by § 97 StPO does not extend to several companies within a group 
or to subsidiaries. Therefore, a group-wide mandating of law firms could be considered 
to achieve broader protection. This applies in particular if the internal investigations con-
cern the whole group.  
 
However, there is a risk that this could be considered as representation of conflicting in-
terests, prohibited by § 43 a (4) BRAO (Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung – German Federal 
Lawyers’ Act) or a violation of the attorney-client relationship by serving various parties 
(§ 356 StGB (Strafgesetzbuch – German Criminal Code)), especially if separate criminal 
proceedings are initiated against the groups’ companies involved. Moreover, the problem 
remains that § 97 StPO is only applicable to the respective investigation proceeding. 
 
Additionally, a counsel must not appear for more than one person accused of the same 
offense (§ 146 StPO). Although a coordinated defense of different companies is generally 
permissible,62 the aforementioned problems regarding § 97 StPO persist. Furthermore, 
not every activity regarding internal investigations can be qualified as a traditional activity 
of defense, even if it is possible in general to defend a company.63 
 
 
 
 
 			
61  Jürgen Wessing, in Corporate Compliance, 1510 et seq. (Christoph Hauschka & Klaus Moosmayer & Thomas 
Lösler, 3rd ed. 2016). 
62  Matthias Dann, in Wirtschaftsstrafrecht, § 146 StPO, marginal no. 54 (Robert Esser & Markus Rübenstahl & 
Frank Saliger & Michael Tsambikakis, 2017); regarding coordinated defense in general Bertram Schmitt, in 
Strafprozessordnung, § 137, marginal no. 11 (Lutz Meyer-Goßner & Bertram Schmitt, 2018). 
63  Jürgen Wessing, in Beck’scher Online-Kommentar, § 148, marginal no. 2 (Jürgen-Peter Graf, 29th ed. 2018); 
Jürgen D. Klengel & Christoph Buchert, Zur Einstufung der Ergebnisse einer „Internal Investigation“ als Ver-
teidigungsunterlagen im Sinne der §§ 97, 148 StPO, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR STRAFRECHT, 383 (2016); 
Matthias Dann, in Wirtschaftsstrafrecht, § 148 StPO, marginal no. 29 (Robert Esser & Markus Rübenstahl & 
Frank Saliger & Michael Tsambikakis, 2017). 
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3. Restrained Use of Data? 
 
Another option could be to create or save less seizable data, for example by not recording 
employee interviews or by avoiding a final report of an internal investigation. In addition, 
data could be stored outside of Germany. 
 
For example, the avoidance of a final report would make it at least more difficult for in-
vestigating authorities to reconstruct the results of an internal investigation. However, 
this would of course affect the client in the same way. Thus, the absence of a final report 
probably might not always be appreciated – although the argument of avoiding possible 
seizure should promote acceptance of this approach, especially since a final report is not 
essential: results can also be presented orally for example. Against the background that 
§ 97 StPO in general is not applicable with regard to documents outside a lawyer’s cus-
tody, this is recommendable anyway.64 A similar practice has been established for a long 
time in the U.S.: U.S. authorities are only presented with oral summaries of reports and 
interviews (so-called readouts and oral downloads).65 However, this practice requires an 
examination of the individual case in order to determine whether such verbal reporting 
fulfills the requirements of corporate responsibilites. For example, a written report is nec-
essary in case of the so-called Expert Reliance Defence, although exceptions are possible 
for good reason.66 
 
From a lawyer's point of view, however, it seems unpractical not to record employee in-
terviews or other pieces of information or evaluations of individual facts in an internal 
investigation. In all likelihood, this would also create a significant tension with regard to 
the responsibilities of the management’s duties. 
 
Following the orders of the Court it was assumed, that employees would be even more 
likely than before to refuse cooperation regarding employee interviews, since the risk of a 
seizure of these documents was considered legal.67 However, it has been predominantly 
considered that there is no protection against seizures of employee interview minutes with 
regard to the company’s lawyer not defending the respective employee. Therefore, it 
			
64  On the custody requirement of § 97 StPO cf. Jörn Hauschild, in Münchener Kommentar zur StPO, § 97, 
marginal no. 19 (Christoph Knauer et al eds., 2014). 
65  Dorothee Herrmann & Finn Zeidler, Arbeitnehmer und interne Untersuchungen – ein Balanceakt, NEUE 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ARBEITSRECHT, 1499, 1502 (2017); with regard to this practice, however, a Florida court has 
recently ruled that the reading of summaries may be a waiver with regard to the underlying interview protocols 
and summaries, SEC v. Herrera et al., No. 17-20301 (S. D. Fl. Dec. 5, 2017). 
66  This has been a requirement since the Ision-Decision of the German Federal Court of Justice, cf. BGH, Order 
of September 20, 2011 – II ZR 234/09 = CORPORATE COMPLIANCE ZEITSCHRIFT, 76, 78 (2012); Barbara 
Dauner-Lieb, in Gesellschaftsrecht, § 93 marginal no. 32a (Martin Henssler & Lutz Strohn, 3rd ed. 2016). 
67  Cf. http://blog.wiwo.de/management/2018/07/11/vier-fragen-anwirtschaftsstrafrechtler-juergen-wessing-in-
terne-ermittlungen-nur-noch-mitdeutschen-kanzleien/ (July 27, 2018). 	
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seems unlikely that the practice of conducting employee interviews will change signifi-
cantly, especially considering the German labor law obligation for employees to cooper-
ate.68 
 
An alternative to the complete renunciation of documentation would be to save infor-
mation digitally on foreign servers. A digital procedure in investigations is probably the 
standard anyway. If, in the event of a seizure, there is no voluntary disclosure, a formal 
request for surrender could not be enforced against persons who are entitled to refuse to 
testify on professional grounds such as lawyers due to § 95 (2) StPO.69 Nonetheless, the 
search and seizure of the lawyer's computers and office servers and the authorities’ at-
tempt to decrypt the data would have to be endured.70 
 
Consequently, it could prove to be advantageous to mandate an international law firm 
whose servers are located outside Germany. Alternatively, the commissioning of foreign 
service providers remains possible. This would require that § 43e (4) BRAO is observed, 
which regulates the use of abroad services and requires a standard of protection compara-
ble to that in Germany.71 As an example, data stored by Jones Day on a server in Belgium, 
which had been downloaded by the Public Prosecutor's Office during the search of the 
premises, could not be used because a request for judicial assistance had not been submit-
ted.72 
 
Since the possibility remains to submit international letters rogatory, there is no absolute 
protection for data saved on foreign servers.73 However, this risk would be manageable 
for servers of a law firm that are operated inside a jurisdiction with a comprehensive legal 
privilege. In addition, this way of access by the Public Prosecutor’s Office is likely to be 
considerably more difficult or at least delayed. 
 			
68  Dorothee Herrmann & Finn Zeidler, Arbeitnehmer und interne Untersuchungen – ein Balanceakt, NEUE 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ARBEITSRECHT, 1499, 1501, 1503 (2017). 
69  Bertram Schmitt, in Strafprozessordnung, § 95, marginal no. 6 (Lutz Meyer-Goßner & Bertram Schmitt, 2018); 
Matthias Jahn, Die Grenzen der Editionspflicht des § 95 StPO – Ein Beitrag zur Systematik der strafprozessu-
alen Vorschriften über die Beschlagnahme, in Festschrift für Claus Roxin zum 80. Geburtstag am 15. Mai 2011, 
1357, 1362 et seq. (2011); Niklas Auffermann & Sebastian Vogel, Wider die Betriebsblindheit – Verhalten bei 
Durchsuchungen in Arztpraxen und Krankenhäusern, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR STRAFRECHT, 387, 
309 (2016). 
70  The review of data carriers in the context of a search, their seizure and - as far as possible - their decoding is 
covered by §§ 94, 110 StPO; cf. Bertram Schmitt, in Strafprozessordnung, § 94, marginal no. 4, 16a et seq., § 110 
marginal no. 2a, 6 (Lutz Meyer-Goßner & Bertram Schmitt, 2018). 
71  On the provision Thomas Knierim, in Gesamtes Strafrecht aktuell, chapter 4, marginal no. 56 et seq. (Thomas 
Knierim & Anna Oehmichen & Susanne Beck & Claudius Geisler, 2018); for other EU member states, it can 
generally be assumed that the level of protection of secret information is the same, BT-Drs. 18/11936, p. 35. 
72  BVerfG, Orders of June 27, 2018 – 2 BvR 1405/17, 2 BvR 1780/17, marginal no. 36. 
73  Bertram Schmitt, in Strafprozessordnung, § 110, marginal no. 7a (Lutz Meyer-Goßner & Bertram Schmitt, 
2018); Wolfgang Bär, Transnationaler Zugriff auf Computerdaten, 2, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INTERNATIONALE 
STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK, 53, 54 et seq. (2011). 
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4. Conclusion 
 
As outlined above, the orders of the Constitutional Court leave only limited protection 
against seizures for lawyers conducting an internal investigation. The most promising 
course of action seems to be the avoidance of data accumulation – and if this approach is 
not realizable, at least the data could be saved on foreign servers. 
 
The situation resulting from the Court’s orders is dissatisfying, especially when compared 
with the U.S. (cf. II.C.), where internal investigations are an essential part of the legal 
practice and the legal privilege therefore is adjusted accordingly. The Court did not use its 
opportunity to establish comparable principles with regard to German legal practice, alt-
hough the relevance of internal investigations in Germany continues to grow. Instead, the 
Court still considers internal investigations to be alien to German law and questions their 
qualification as a mandate in a traditional sense. Hence, the Constitutional Court coun-
teracts more recent efforts to create incentives for the disclosure of incriminating evidence 
and to reward companies for transparency and cooperation (cf. IV.). Not least, it seems 
that the Court has not adequately considered the fact, that its assessment grants a com-
petitive advantage to those foreign law firms with servers located abroad, to which it has 
denied fundamental rights. 
IV. THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION 
 
The orders of the Court clearly demonstrate the need for unambiguous and balanced legal 
regulations regarding internal investigations. These regulations have to include a practi-
cable protection for lawyers and law firms against searches and seizures. At the beginning 
of 2018, the German government announced its intention to regulate internal investiga-
tions including searches and seizures. These plans explicitly include the creation of legal 
incentives for the disclosure of information.74 
 
A decision of the German Federal Court of Justice in a decision from May 2017 points 
into the same direction: According to the decision, the establishment of an efficient com-
pliance management system must be taken into account when imposing a corporate fine. 
The Court further stated that the company’s reaction to an infringement has to be con-
sidered as well.75 
			
74  Coalition contract between CDU; CSU and SPD, 19th legislative period, dated March 12, 2018, p. 126, (Jul. 27, 
2018), https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/StatischeSeiten/Breg/koalitionsvertrag-inhaltsver-
zeichnis.html. 
75  BGH, Order of May 9, 2017 – 1 StR 265/16, marginal no. 118 = CORPORATE COMPLIANCE ZEITSCHRIFT, 285, 
(2017). 	
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The regulation of internal investigations and the creation of incentives are already in-
cluded in various drafts for a corporate criminal law.76 For example, the Cologne Draft 
for an Association Sanctions Act (Kölner Entwurf für das Verbandssanktionengesetz), in-
spired by comparison to U.S. law, contains several proposals for procedural regulations 
for dealing with the findings of internal investigations. The draft includes a right for law-
yers (including in-house lawyers) to refuse testimony on results and progress of internal 
investigations, and it prohibits the seizure of all records regarding such an investigation.77 
 
However, if the right to refuse to give evidence and restrictions on seizure depend on the 
content of the mandate or on the conduct of the internal investigation, the problem of 
differentiating between normal legal representation and defense may arise.78 This was, in 
fact, one of the main reasons why a differentiation between defense lawyers and other 
lawyers in a previous version of § 160a StPO was abandoned in an amendment from 
2011.79 
 
As a logical consequence, the legislator should clarify that § 160a (1) StPO offers compre-
hensive protection for all types of lawyers against investigative measures by the state. It 
remains incomprehensible why a lawyer may refuse testimony about a mandate while the 
exact same information may be seized in written form.80 The attempted justification by 
merely referencing the constitutionally required “effectiveness of criminal prosecution” 
is by all means insufficient. The effectiveness of the criminal prosecution is comple-
mented and contrasted by the constitutional requirement for an effective and orderly ad-
ministration of justice and the requirement of a fair trial. Both demand a corresponding 
protection of the attorney-client privilege. The Constitutional Court also pointed this out 
			
76  On the various drafts Carsten Beisheim & Laura Jung, Unternehmensstrafrecht: Der neue Kölner Entwurf 
eines Verbandssanktionengesetzes (VerbSG-E), CORPORATE COMPLIANCE ZEITSCHRIFT, 63 (2018); see also 
propo-sals by Carsten Momsen & Thomas Grützner, Gesetzliche Regelung unternehmensinterner Untersu-
chungen – Gewinn an Rechtsstaatlichkeit oder unnötige Komplikation?, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE ZEIT-
SCHRIFT, 242 (2017). 
77  MARTIN HENSSLER & ELISA HOVEN & MICHAEL KUBICIEL & THOMAS WEIGEND, KÖLNER ENTWURF EI-
NES VERBANDSSANKTIONENGESETZES, 10, 24 et seq. (2017); on the draft see also Carsten Beisheim & Laura 
Jung, Unternehmensstrafrecht: Der neue Kölner Entwurf eines Verbandssanktionengesetzes (VerbSG-E), COR-
PORATE COMPLIANCE ZEITSCHRIFT, 63 (2018). Also in favor of the inclusion of in-house lawyers in the circle 
of those entitled to refuse testimony Hendrik Schneider, Das Unternehmen in der Schildkröten-Formation – 
Der Schutzbereich des Anwaltsprivilegs im deutschen und US-Strafrecht, 9, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INTERNATIO-
NALE STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK, 626, 633 et seq. (2016). 
78  LG Mannheim, Order of July 3, 2012 – 24 Qs 1, 2/12 = NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR STRAFRECHT, 713, 716 (2012). 
79  BT-Drs. 17/2637 (2010), p. 6. 
80  Likewise: Margarete Gräfin v. Galen, LG Hamburg, 15. 10. 2010 – 608 Qs 18/10: Beschlagnahme von Inter-
viewprotokollen nach „Internal Investigations” – HSH Nordbank, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 942, 
945 (2011). 	
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in numerous decisions.81 Since the Court apparently did not want to balance these con-
flicting interests appropriately, it remains the legislator's responsibility to do so. 
 
The repeated allegation by the Constitutional Court and lower courts of a possible abuse 
of the legal privilege by lawyers demonstrates an unjustified distrust against the advocacy. 
The assumption that a comprehensive legal privilege would lead to numerous lawyers be-
ing used as “safehouses” for incriminating evidence82 is absurd and completely disregards 
the impending professional and criminal consequences of such conduct. This risk is al-
ready addressed by § 160a (4) StPO and § 97 (2) sentences 2 and 3 StPO.83 Another effec-
tive measure against such a risk, suggested by the Mannheim Regional Court and imple-
mentable through amendment, is that the protection of § 160a (1) sentence 1 could be lim-
ited in the case of obvious abuse.84 
 
In addition, a legal incentive to cooperate with investigation authorities and disclose rele-
vant information is necessary. This would require that companies would be able to rely 
on their communication with their lawyers to be treated confidentially. It is now up to 
the legislator to develop the legal framework enabling an appropriate balance of power 
between law enforcement authorities and those parties affected. According to recent me-
dia reports, the Federal Ministry of Justice is currently working on a draft legislation for a 
corporate criminal law including regulations for internal investigations and plans to pub-
lish its draft in summer 2019.85 It is hoped that the draft addresses the outlined questions 
regarding legal privilege and achieves legal certainty for all parties involved. 
			
81  Fundamentally: BVerfG, Orders of March 30, 2004 – 2 BvR 1520/01, 2 BvR 1521/01, marginal no. 100 = NEUE 
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 1305, 1307 (2004); see also BVerfG, Order of January 12, 2016 – 1 BvL 6/13, 
marginal no. 83 = NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 700, 706 (2016); BVerfG, Order of November 6, 
2014 – 2 BvR 2928/10, marginal no. 18; BVerfG, Order of March 18, 2009 – 2 BvR 1036/08, marginal no. 64 = 
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 2518, 2519 (2009); BVerfG, Order of April 12, 2005 – 2 BvR 1027/02, 
marginal no. 94 = NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 1917, 1919 (2005). 
82  BVerfG, Orders of June 27, 2018 – 2 BvR 1405/17, 2 BvR 1780/17, marginal no. 91. 
83  According to those regulations, restrictions on searches and seizures shall not apply if certain facts sub-stantiate 
the suspicion that a lawyer participated in the criminal offence investigated by the prosecu-tion. 
84  LG Mannheim, Order of July 3, 2012 – 24 Qs 1, 2/12 = NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR STRAFRECHT, 713, 716 (2012). 
85  Cf. reports by Handelsblatt, (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutsch-
land/sanktionsrecht-wie-katarina-barley-interne-firmenermittlungen-regulieren-
moechte/24071464.html?ticket=ST-2075041-WFSQyFwOzyMtwDEEjJyc-ap4; and JUVE, (Mar. 7, 2019), 
https://www.juve.de/nachrichten/namenundnachrichten/2019/03/neues-unternehmensstrafrecht-zaehes-
ringen-um-die-interne-ermittlung. 
